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The rise of non-Western powers has led to competing claims about how these states act 
amongst each other and how they behave vis-à-vis established powers. Existing accounts 
argue that the rising powers are a heterogenous group of competing states and that they are 
socialized into the existing Western-centered order. We challenge these claims, arguing 
that the rising powers are dissatisfied with the international status quo and that they have 
begun to form a bloc against the established powers. We contend that this dissatisfaction 
arises from their lack of influence on the international stage, their status in the international 
hierarchy, and the norms that sustain the current international order. We maintain that the 
formation of a rising powers bloc is driven by their economic growth and international 
dynamics, fostering their institutionalization as IBSA and BRICS. To support our 
argument, we combine spatial modeling techniques to analyze rising power voting 
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Since Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War, the rise of new powers and the 
resulting shifts in the international distribution of power have been associated with major 
turbulence in world politics. The current rise of non-Western powers such as Brazil, Russia, 
India, China and South Africa represents such a shift and is widely considered to be one of 
the most significant changes in international politics over the past few decades.1 While a 
growing body of literature has advanced our knowledge about the rising powers, we still 
lack a clear understanding of how the current power shift affects the international system. 
Do rising powers oppose established powers, creating potentially dangerous tension in 
international politics as some scholars and observers predict? Are we witnessing the 
“remaking of world order” (Acharya 2018; Huntington 1996; Kupchan 2012), or do we 
observe the integration and socialization of rising powers into the Western-centered 
international order, leading to harmony and cooperation between ‘new’ and ‘old’ powers, 
if not to the “ultimate ascendance of the liberal order” (Ikenberry 2011, 57; also, Kahler 
2013), as others claim? 
 
This paper challenges two prominent arguments: it questions the more optimistic view that 
the rising powers are socialized and integrated into the existing Western-centered order. It 
also counters the claim that these powers are a set of highly diverse actors with diverging 
if not competing interests and strategies (Hart and Jones 2010, Laïdi 2012). Rather, we 
 
1 Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa maintain key commonalities and have institutionalized as 
BRICS and IBSA Yet, we acknowledge important differences in their respective power, including those 
that are rising, though not (yet) major powers: Brazil, India and South Africa (according to the Correlates 
of War project or Volgy et al. 2011, 1-26 ); China, which has recently risen to major power status; and a 




argue that the rising powers have begun to form a bloc of dissatisfied states opposing the 
dominant Western powers and the status quo they maintain. We contend that this 
dissatisfaction arises from three sources: a) influence on the international stage, b) status 
in the international hierarchy and c) the norms and principles that sustain the current 
international order. Dissatisfaction with the international status quo is not new, but what 
has changed since the turn of the century is that the rising powers have begun to form a 
bloc of jointly dissatisfied states. The formation of this bloc, we argue, has resulted from 
endogenous and exogenous dynamics. Internally, the rising powers have experienced a 
contemporaneous increase in power over the past years driven mainly by unusually high 
economic growth rates – consistently higher than those in developed countries – enabling 
them to press for a more influential role in international politics. Externally, the limits of 
both Western self-restraint and capacity demonstrated by the war on terror after 9/11, the 
war in Iraq without UN mandate, regime change in Libya and the instability of the ‘liberal’ 
order exemplified by the 2008 financial crisis have encouraged the formation of this bloc. 
Jointly, these dynamics have fostered the institutionalization of the rising powers as IBSA 
[India, Brazil, South Africa] and BRICS [Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa].  
 
To evaluate whether the rising powers have begun to form such a bloc of dissatisfied states, 
we provide a systematic comparative analysis of rising powers and established powers 
across issue areas and over time. In doing so, we go beyond the extant scholarship on the 
rising powers that has favored anecdotal evidence including selected foreign policy 
episodes or statements of state leaders, or which has remained confined to the analysis of 
individual rising powers or of selected rising power-established power dyads (namely, the 
US and China). A smaller number of studies have examined the rising powers as a group, 
though these tend to focus on their inward dynamics, to the exclusion of their interaction 
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with the established powers. Finally, many analyses remain confined to specific issue areas 
such as international climate negotiations or the international economy.  
 
To address these limitations, our approach is to analyze the voting behavior of the rising 
powers within the context of a global multi-issue international organization (IO), the 
United Nations General Assembly (GA). Assessing voting in the GA is particularly well-
suited to address whether rising powers are forming a bloc and position themselves against 
established powers because it provides us with consistent data on the positions of a large 
number of countries (potentially all United Nations member states), both over time and 
across a broad range of issues in world politics. Our approach builds on work pioneered by 
Poole and Rosenthal (1991) to study voting in the US Congress and that scholars have 
extended to analyze voting behavior in international legislative bodies, such as the 
European Parliament (Hix 2001), the UN Human Rights Council (Hug and Lukács 2014) 
and the GA (Bailey et al. 2017; Voeten 2000; 2004). Particularly relevant to the present 
study is Voeten’s (2000) analysis of voting in the GA, identifying the formation of a post-
Cold War conflict line between Western and Non-western states. Voeten (2004) also finds 
support for the claim that the US has become an increasingly ‘lonely superpower’ in world 
politics. Two recent studies focus on rising powers using voting in the GA. Ferdinand 
(2014) seeks to identify the possible convergence in the foreign policies of BRICS states 
by comparing their voting behavior in the GA over six time periods between 1974 and 
2011 to find increasing voting cohesion among them. Hooijmaaijers and Keukeleire (2016) 
examine whether the intensified interaction of the rising powers in the BRICS framework 
has resulted in stronger voting cohesion among the rising powers in the GA, over the period 
2006-2014. Unlike Ferdinand, they conclude that it is “not possible to speak about a 
cohesive BRICS bloc in the General Assembly” (Hooijmaaijers and Keukeleire 2016, 397). 
These analyses remain largely restricted to voting cohesion among the rising powers and 
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their findings are inconclusive. We go beyond these studies in two important ways. First, 
we analyze the voting behavior of rising powers both as a group and vis-à-vis the 
established powers. Second, we use methods that are better suited to shed light on voting 
behavior. Rather than relying on cohesion measures that are prone to bias – unable to 
discriminate between changes in preferences versus changes in the Assembly’s agenda 
(Bailey et al. 2017, 433) – we use roll-call votes in the GA to construct probabilistic models 
of states’ ideal points based on spatial models of voting, and assess how distant these are 
from one another. Specifically, we apply a combination of W-NOMINATE (Poole 2005) 
and a dynamic ordinal spatial model based on Item Response Theory (Bailey et al. 2017) 
to analyze more than 1,000 roll-call votes in the GA from 1992 to 2011, focusing on two 
different groups of rising powers (BRICS and IBSA). We compare their voting behavior 
to the coalition of major status quo powers representing the main supporters of ‘liberal’ 
world order— the G7, which has historically demonstrated a high degree of voting 
cohesion in the GA (Volgy et al 2003). 
 
We find dramatic convergence in the voting behavior of the rising powers, largely in 
parallel to the institutionalization of BRICS and IBSA summits. Concurrently, our analysis 
reveals that the rising powers vote in ways that are fundamentally different from the 
established powers. In fact, the voting behavior of ‘new’ and ‘old’ powers differs across a 
large set of issues in international politics, ranging from human rights to disarmament, fault 
lines that have remained strikingly stable since the end of the Cold War. At a more general 
level, this suggests that international politics is characterized by a commonality of 
dissatisfaction2 on the part of the rising powers and interest incompatibility between old 
 
2 We acknowledge helpful phrasing provided by an anonymous reviewer. 
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and new powers rather than by the harmonious integration of the rising powers into the 
existing Western-centered international order.  
 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: In the next section, we develop our 
theoretical argument situated in four elements: sources of rising power dissatisfaction, 
internal economic growth, external dynamics, and the resulting institutionalization of the 
rising powers as a bloc of dissatisfied states (IBSA, BRICS). We then introduce the models 
of probabilistic voting and the GA voting data we use to test it. The penultimate section 
presents and interprets the results of the analysis. We conclude by briefly laying out some 
avenues for further research.
 
Dissatisfaction and the formation of a counterhegemonic bloc  
We propose that the rising powers – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – are 
dissatisfied with the international status quo and have begun to form a bloc of states against 
the Western powers that maintain it. This argument builds on insights from power 
transition theory (PTT) that expects shifts in the international distribution of power to lead 
to turbulence and conflict in world politics (Kugler and Organski 1989; Organski 1968; 
Tammen et al. 2000). The main claim underlying this expectation is that powers 
experiencing a rapid relative increase in their economic, demographic, and military power 
are positioned to challenge the existing order that has been created by the dominant powers 
at the top of the international hierarchy to serve their interests. Conflict is likely to arise in 
such situations because the rising powers seek to change (or overthrow) the established 
order, while the dominant powers seek to resist substantial changes to that order, defending 
their privileged position therein. To some observers, conflict is almost inevitable during 
such power shifts (Gilpin 1983). For the proponents of PTT, by contrast, conflict does not 
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follow automatically. It only occurs if the rising challenger is dissatisfied with the 
international status quo, that is, it is “dissatisfied with the established international 
leadership, its rules and norms, and wishes to change them” (Tammen et al. 2000, 9). While 
the scholarship on rising powers typically focuses on rising challenger/declining hegemon 
relationships (such as the US and China currently), PTT reminds us that dissatisfied rising 
powers can form partnerships to challenge the dominant power (Tammen et al. 2000, 11). 
At the same time, the rising powers do not necessarily confront a single hegemon but a 
group of established powers that together defend the international status quo (Wohlforth 
1999, 30). In proposing that Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa have begun to 
form such a bloc of dissatisfied states (as IBSA and BRICS) that oppose the ‘liberal’ 
international order and its main defenders, the US and its Western allies (the G7), our claim 
is that this dissatisfaction stems from three (interrelated) sources: dissatisfaction with (1) 
their influence in the current order, (2) with their status in that order, and (3) with the 
norms, rules, and institutions underpinning it.  
 
Influence. Influence is the capacity of an actor to achieve desired outcomes by modifying 
a target’s behavior and, while the means to achieving influence may be coercive, it may 
also be persuasive in nature (Knorr 1973). The rising powers all possess substantial 
economic, military, and political power resources (Hurrell 2006); however, they have not 
been able to fully transform these resources into political influence to secure material 
benefits and shape the international “rules of the game”. Many Western-centered 
institutions maintain formal and informal rules that provide its most powerful (Western) 
members with disproportionate benefits and reflect those powers’ normative 
understandings of international order (Ikenberry 2001). Rising powers have forcefully 
advocated, but with limited success, for reforms that would increase their influence in 
international institutions, including efforts to achieve UNSC reform, gain access to 
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leadership positions in the WTO and the Inter-Development Bank, shape international 
negotiations on security, trade and climate change (Hopewell 2016; Narlikar 2011; Soares 
and Hirst 2006). Seeking greater influence in the Western-dominated Bretton Woods 
institutions, rising powers have demanded increases in their relative voting shares to 
counter a de facto G7 veto. And they have been critical of the informal procedure of 
appointing the head of the IMF and the Bank, where the Bank presidency is held by an 
American and the Fund’s managing director is a European.3 But even when, in 2010, both 
institutions adapted to increase voting shares for the rising powers, the voting-power-to-
GDP ratio remained heavily skewed toward Western countries (Vestergaard and Wade 
2015, 4-5). With the exception of Russia, the rising powers have also been excluded from 
G7/8 club of advanced industrial economies that was complemented, though not replaced, 
by the G20 group of developed and developing countries only in the context of the 2008 
financial crisis.4 
 
Status. The rising powers also seek positive recognition or status (Deng 2008, 21).5 Like 
influence, status has material implications in that higher status can increase a state’s power 
and wealth through enhanced economic and diplomatic exchange, but status also activates 
positive emotions like pride and respect. Domestically, leaders can generate legitimacy by 
credibly demonstrating a commitment to elevate the state’s status (Ward 2017, 37). The 
rising powers believe they are entitled to a more important role in the Western-dominated 
international system (Hurrell 2006, 1-5), are all the dominant actors in their respective 
regions, and “have taken on a self-appointed role as leaders” (Stephen 2012, 293) in various 
 
3 Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries’ Leaders, Yekaterinburg, Russia, June 16, 2009, para 3 
http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/090616-leaders.html 
4 On the level of the finance minsters the G20 has been meeting since 1999. 
5 See also Paul, et al. 2014, Renshon 2017; Volgy et al. 2011; Ward 2017.  
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non-Western alliances, including the G77 at the UN and the G20 at the WTO. Their 
expectations have not yet been met by established powers, leading to status inconsistency 
or status dissatisfaction. Status elevation has been a key part of China’s foreign policy since 
the mid-1990s (Deng 2008, 8-9), not least to generate domestic legitimacy for the 
Communist Party’s leadership. India, too, has sought to elevate its international standing, 
mounting its own challenges to the existing order—most prominently by acquiring nuclear 
capability in violation of the non-proliferation regime (Nayar and Paul 2003, 11, 14-15). 
Similarly, Brazil and South Africa have demanded a permanent seat on the UN Security 
Council (Soares and Hirst 2006, 29; Schoeman 2015, 436). Unlike other rising powers, 
Russia is a resurgent power, often directing foreign policy pursuits at reestablishing its 
great power status and reasserting influence over the former Soviet states (MacFarlane 
2006, 5). The G7/8 ‘outreach’ (or Heiligendamm) process that began in the mid-2000s 
demonstrated a lack of recognition by the established powers, when Brazil, China, India, 
(and Mexico) were invited to join the G7/8 summits but were not included in decision 
making. Excluded from the main discussions, South African President Mbeki complained 
that the rising powers had “only been asked to join in the dessert and miss the main meal” 
(cited in Schoeman 2015, 435).  
 
Normative dissatisfaction. The rising powers are not just unhappy about their lack of 
influence and status in the international order, they are also dissatisfied with the (Western) 
norms, rules, and institutions that underpin the existing order. Normative dissatisfaction 
results in efforts to change the normative foundation of the prevailing order (Ward 2017, 
11). The post-Cold War era has seen a dramatic strengthening of Western norms that is at 
odds with those held by the rising powers: economic deregulation as reflected in the 
Washington Consensus versus interventionist state capitalism (Stephen 2014) and the 
promotion and protection of human rights and humanitarian intervention (“responsibility 
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to protect”) versus the primacy of state sovereignty (Hurrell 2006). With respect to 
international institutions, the rising powers have traditionally preferred unanimity 
decisions over majority decisions and sovereignty affirming international institutions over 
institutions with high levels of authority (Blake and Payton 2015). 
   
Dissatisfaction with their influence, status, and prevailing international norms among rising 
powers is hardly new. What is novel and begs explanation is why these powers have begun 
to form a bloc of jointly dissatisfied states against the established Western powers. We 
argue that endogenous changes within the rising power group and exogenous dynamics 
that, taken together, have led to the institutionalization of the rising powers as IBSA and 
BRICS around the turn of the century.  
 
Endogenous change. For a counterhegemonic bloc to form, not only must its members be 
dissatisfied with the international status quo, they must also rise in power which they 
achieve mainly through economic growth (Tammen et al. 2000, p. 17; Gilpin 1983). This 
applies to the rising powers that have experienced extraordinary economic growth rates 
since the early 2000s, empowering them to seek more diplomatic clout. Indeed, despite the 
economic woes of the new Russian Federation, the BRICS as a group, boasted higher 
economic growth rates than the G7 in the first decade after the fall of the Soviet Union 
(IMF 2019). The pace only quickened in the following decade, with the BRICS economies 
averaging just over 6% growth, compared to the G7’s 1.4% (IMF 2019). Two widely noted 
reports published by Goldman Sachs in the early 2000s predicted a much greater weight of 
the BRICs in the world economy within the next decade (O’Neill 2001, 6-8)6 and projected 
 
6
 The author of the 2001 report Jim O’Neill coined the term ‘BRICs’ (South Africa was not yet a member 
at the time) 
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that the BRICs could overtake the US, Japan, UK, Germany, France and Italy in less than 
forty years (Wilson and Purushothaman 2003, 3-5). This shift represents a marked change 
in the international distribution of power and has been widely noted by scholars and 
observers. At the end of the 1990s Wohlforth argued that international politics was 
unambiguously and durably unipolar (1999, 7-8), with the US (and its Western allies) 
firmly on top of the international hierarchy. Just ten years later, observers noted that “the 
‘unipolar moment’ is over” (Layne 2012, 203); that the US is “no longer a hyperpower 
towering over potential contenders;” and that the “rest of the world is catching up” 
(Schweller and Pu 2011, 41-42). Their rise in power has enabled the BRICS countries to 
press for more influential roles in world politics. For example, India, Brazil and South 
Africa strongly restated their traditional demands on international trade, the reform of 
international institutions, and economic development (Vieira and Alden 2011, 511). Brazil 
and India led the Group of 20 within the WTO developing countries, resisted attempts by 
the US and the EU to consolidate their agricultural subsidy policies; while China and 
Russia have prevented a meaningful UN response to the civil war in Syria,7 and, seeking 
to act as a global norm entrepreneur, Brazil has proposed “a responsibility while 
protecting” aimed at limiting the use of force included in the R2P’s third pillar.  
 
International dynamics. In addition to changes occurring within the rising powers, 
exogenous factors have helped to coalesce an otherwise heterogeneous group of states as 
the rise in power of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa has coincided with a 
decline in the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Western-centered order. The aggressive 
unilateral security policies the US has adopted in its ‘war on terror’ after 9/11, the US-led 
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2003 invasion of Iraq (without UN mandate), and regime change by Western powers in 
Libya in the name of the responsibility to protect, have damaged the legitimacy of the 
Western-centered order, and have exposed the limits of Western (and in particular US) 
strategic self-restraint (Pape 2005, 35; Mastanduno 2019; Schweller and Pu 2011; Walt 
2006). In international trade, the dominant Western powers were unwilling at WTO Doha 
Round to open their markets for agricultural trade from the global South (Vieira and Alden 
2012), and the 2007/8 financial crisis has called to the attention of the rising powers the 
instability of ‘liberal’ economic and financial order, as well as the fiscal constraints facing 
the dominant Western economies (Armijio and Roberts 2014, 503).  
 
Institutionalization. Both dynamics – endogenous change as well as external pressures 
and opportunities, we argue, have fostered the institutionalization of the rising powers as 
IBSA and BRIC(S) groups. Both groupings have multiple aims. They serve to increase 
intra-IBSA and BRICS cooperation, to harmonize their views across a set of international 
issues and to coordinate their foreign policies (Viera and Alden 2011, Armijio and Roberts 
2014, Stuenkel 2015). The IBSA dialogue forum, established by India, Brazil and South 
Africa in 2003, had its first High Level meeting at the fringes of the G8 summit in Evian 
to serve as a tool for foreign policy coordination in the areas of international trade and 
security among the three countries (Vieira and Alden 2011). Like IBSA, BRICS is an 
informal institutional platform for cooperation and policy coordination. Initiated by Russia 
alongside the 2005 GA meeting, the BRICs members have been convening since 2006 
(informally) and formally as BRICs since 2009.8 Apart from their respective annual 
summits, IBSA and BRICS have significantly intensified technical cooperation by 
developing a structure that mirrors the G-7 from finance and trade, to public health, 
 
8 South Africa entered the group in 2010/11. 
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agriculture, science and research, the judiciary, and defense (Stuenkel 2015, chapter 5). 
But the BRICS also aim to challenge Western dominance in world politics and to increase 
their global influence by working together to harmonize their negotiation positions on a 
range of issues (Armijio and Roberts 2014, for IBSA see Alden and Viera 2012). 
According to one Brazilian representative, the BRICS serves its members as “a forum for 
convergence” (Stuenkel 2015, 89). Importantly, the BRICS have established parallel 
institutions such as the New Development Bank and the Contingency Reserve Agreement 
as an alternative to the IMF and the World Bank in which the dominant Western powers 
exercise disproportionate influence.  
 
IBSA and BRICS members possess substantial economic, military, and political power 
resources, and differences persist. Yet, they have managed to leverage their diversity in 
advantageous ways. While China stands out as the most powerful among them, the other 
members help Beijing to multilateralize its foreign policy strategies, while bringing 
important resources to the table. Like China, Russia and India are nuclear powers. 
Moreover, Brazil and India can mobilize coalitions of developing states from the global 
South (Hopewell 2016). Russia, a resurgent power, offers unique know-how in dealing 
with the hegemon, while South Africa, a regional leader in Africa, adds legitimacy and 
representativeness to the club (Schoeman 2015, 434, 440-441).9 
 
If our argument is correct and rising powers have begun to form a bloc of dissatisfied states, 
holding similar views about a range of international issues, we should observe an 
expression of their joint dissatisfaction with the international status quo by voting in 
 
9 South Africa has been admitted to the BRICs club despite Nigeria now being the continent’s biggest 
economy (Schoeman 2015, 432).  
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increasingly similar ways in the GA and by consistently voting against the US and its 
Western allies as the main defenders of that status quo.10  
 
Competing Views: The logic of integration  
Our argument challenges competing views on rising power behavior in important ways. 
First, it counters accounts depicting the rising powers as a set of highly diverse actors with 
diverging if not competing interests and strategies. It has been often argued, that the ability 
of the rising powers to oppose the Western powers is limited due to intra-BRICS rivalry. 
For example, Hart and Jones (2010, 85) note, “tensions within this group still outweigh 
tensions between any one member and the United States”, while Laïdi (2012, 615) 
describes the BRICS as a “heterogeneous group of often competing countries” whose only 
commonality lies in a strong preference for state sovereignty and independence of national 
action. 
 
Our argument also challenges accounts emphasizing processes of accommodation and 
socialization, which claim that rather than confronting the dominant powers, the rising 
powers integrate themselves harmoniously into the existing international order. Ikenberry, 
in particular, has extended the logic of liberal world order to the non-Western powers. In 
his view, the existing Western-centered order is expected to accommodate new powers 
rather than to give way to a more contested and fragmented system (Ikenberry 2011, also 
Kahler 2013). There are two mechanisms explaining integration. First, the existing order 
is harder to overturn – great power war is no longer a means to change the international 
 
10 We share Ball’s view that a “bloc” is formed by states that consistently vote as a group on “all or 




system, which makes change necessarily less radical and more incremental. Second, 
integration into the existing order is in the rising powers’ own interest, as they benefit from 
its rules, practices and institutions (Ikenberry and Wright 2008, 11). Indicating that today’s 
power shift is not the end of the ‘liberal’ order but represents its “ultimate ascendance” 
(Ikenberry 2011, 57).  
 
Other make similar claims of a rather smooth integration by emerging powers, emphasizing 
processes of socialization. To the extent that rising powers participate in Western-shaped 
international institutions, socializing effects are expected to emerge through regular and 
sustained interaction in these institutions, altering the identities and ultimately the interests 
of their member states (Johnston 2008; Kent 2002). 
 
Both claims bear observable implications for voting in the GA. If relations among the rising 
powers are characterized by political incoherence, tension, and disagreement, this should 
find its expression in divergent voting behavior of the IBSA and BRICS members in the 
GA. Likewise, voting in the GA should reflect the hypothesized processes of 
socialization.11 If an integrative logic of liberal world order is at work in international 
politics and the rising powers are being socialized into that order, we should observe 
interest convergence between rising powers (BRICS, IBSA) and the Western status quo 
powers (G7) in that they vote in (increasingly) similar ways in the GA. These predictions 
stand in contrast to the argument we offer, according to which we should observe that the 
 
11 Bearce and Bondanella (2007) have analyzed GA voting to find that membership in specific regional and 






rising powers vote in similar ways among themselves and that they consistently vote 
against the established powers.  
  
Analyzing Voting in the UN General Assembly  
To empirically evaluate these propositions, we use GA roll-calls to construct probabilistic 
models of voting that rely on the assumptions of spatial models of politics; based in Black’s 
(1958) median voter theorem. We use W-NOMINATE to estimate ideal points of UN 
member states. This allows us to assess the ideological distance among the rising powers 
(BRICS and IBSA states) and between the rising and established powers (the G7 states) in 
a multi-dimensional policy space (Poole et al. 2011; Reed et al. 2008; Voeten 2000). W-
NOMINATE facilitates the study of voting behavior because it allows us to identify the 
most salient cleavages upon which states vote – dimensionality of conflict –in international 
politics, and provides information about the content of votes in the GA (human rights, 
disarmament, economic development etc.); however, it is less suited to accommodate 
changes in the voting behavior over time (i.e. it is not dynamic). To address this potential 
problem, we complement the W-NOMINATE analysis with a (one-dimensional) dynamic 
model of voting based on item response theory (Bailey et al. 2017). 
 
We believe that voting in the GA is appropriate to test our argument about rising power 
behavior in IOs. The GA is the “only forum in which a large number of states meet and 
vote on a regular basis on issues concerning the international community” (Voeten 2000, 
186). This approach provides us with consistent data on the voting behavior of potentially 
all UN member states, across a large number of issues in international politics, and over a 




We acknowledge that the analysis of voting in the GA carries some limitations. First, 
voting in the GA is largely symbolic; unlike resolutions in the Security Council, those 
adopted by the GA are non-binding. However, noncompulsory decisions and the lack of 
direct policy output lends states more freedom to maximize their interests than in other 
international arenas (Voeten 2000). Moreover, even though GA resolutions are not legally 
binding, they may nevertheless be consequential. As Abbott and Snidal indicate, inclusive 
institutions such as the GA “can have substantial impact on international politics by 
expressing shared values on issues like human rights [et cetera] in ways that legitimate or 
delegitimize state conduct” (Abbott and Snidal 1998, 24). Similarly, debates and voting 
within the GA are reflected in states’ foreign policy behaviors such as loan disbursements 
by international financial institutions (Voeten 2012, 3) and sanctions placed on Russia as 
a result of the annexation of Crimea.12   
 
Second, some have suggested that voting in the GA is affected by vote buying – states trade 
votes in the GA for various forms of US aid (Dreher et al. 2008) or IMF loans (Dreher and 
Sturm 2012) – biasing the ways in which states vote.13 Others, however, have found that 
the extent of vote buying in the GA remains limited in scope (Carter and Stone 2015) and 
argue that the evidence concerning the conditions under which vote buying occurs is mixed 
(Mattes et al. 2015, 283). And, while vote buying may affect the voting behavior of weaker 
recipient states, this is less plausible when it comes to more powerful states such as the 
BRICS. If votes of the rising powers were ‘bought’, effectively pulling these states closer 
to the Western position, this would strengthen rather than undermine our argument, as we 
 
12 In the latter case, the G7 and the BRICS were on opposing sides of several resolutions (A/Res/71/205, 
A/Res/72/190, A/Res/73/194) with Brazil abstaining.  
13
 Dreher, et al. 2008 find no evidence for vote buying on the part of the other G7 members. 
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expect the rising powers to form a counterhegemonic bloc of states and to vote against the 
established Western powers. Thus, if vote-buying is occurring and we observe 
contestation, this means that in the unlikely case where rising powers submit to pressure to 
vote with the G7, they are resisting despite the carrots and sticks on offer.  
 
To analyze the voting behavior of the rising powers in the GA we use the “United Nations 
General Assembly Voting data” compiled by Strezhnev and Voeten (2012). The data 
contains all roll-call votes; that is, all contested votes on resolutions in the GA. Resolutions 
that are not put to a vote because they were adopted “by consensus,” “by acclamation,” or 
similar measures are not included in the data set. These constitute the majority of the 
resolutions adopted in GA, around 64% between 1974 and 2004 (Peterson 2006). We 
exclude resolutions without a vote for two reasons. First, they do not allow us to estimate 
the ideal points of rising and established powers. Second, the vast majority of resolutions 
that are adopted without a vote are inconsequential in that they do not require UN members 
to take specific actions. To this, add that a large proportion of resolutions call on the UN 
itself to act (to organize meetings or to coordinate with other intergovernmental 
organizations, for instance). As a result, the obligation to act often lies not with UN member 
states, but with the Secretariat and other UN bureaucracies. Only once this burden shifts to 
UN members themselves do we observe increased roll call voting. Specifically, roll call 
voting is almost always the modus operandi when states —or groups within states — are 
at the center of resolutions. The distinction is consistent with general knowledge about the 
political nature of the UN — once particular member states are implicated (or blamed), 
consensus falls by the wayside.  
 
GA resolutions are adopted by a “one-state, one-vote” majority principle. The data report 
whether a state voted for or against the resolution, abstained from the vote, or was absent. 
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Absenteeism is usually regarded as missing data. Abstentions, however, have been treated 
as missing values (Reed et al. 2008), or as intermediate action between “yea” and “nay” 
(Bailey et al. 2017). Here, we handle abstentions in two ways. First, we consider 
abstentions as another – softer – way of voting “no” and merge “abstentions” and “no” 
votes into the same category (Voeten 2000; 2004). This is because, in the GA, states use 
both types of votes to express disagreement with a resolution. As Voeten explains, “[S]ince 
UNGA resolutions are not binding, what really matters is whether or not a state is willing 
to go on the record for supporting a resolution.” (Voeten 2000, 193). Second, we analyze 
a model in which abstentions are considered a mid-point. 
 
We analyze two 10-year time periods, 1992-2001 and 2002-2011, spanning the immediate 
post-Cold War period through the post-9/11 period. The first period can be considered as 
“Western dominance” in world politics, following the dissolution of the Soviet 
bloc/Warsaw Pact. Additionally, this period includes South Africa’s reinstatement of 
voting rights following the end of apartheid.14 The second period has been selected because 
it coincides with the rise in power of non-Western economies and their institutionalization 
as IBSA and BRICS. 
 
Finally, we introduce the G7 as benchmark against which the formation of a rising power 
bloc and their confrontation of the dominant powers can be assessed. The G7 composes 
the world’s major status quo powers, including the US, which makes it an appropriate 
touchstone. The G7 was formed in the mid-1970s by the most powerful liberal economies 
to address systemic disturbances and has since displayed consistently high levels of voting 
 
14
 South Africa was suspended from the GA from 1974 to 1994. 
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cohesion in the GA (Volgy et al. 2003, 105).15 The group has met as the G8 after the 
inclusion of Russia in 2002; however, they continue to meet more frequently sans Russia. 
Originally created as an informal institution to coordinate the world economy, the G7’s 
tasks have expanded to a range of non-economic issues, including security and the 
environment. Overall, the G7 lends itself well as a comparison group because neither the 
G7 nor the IBSA and BRICS groups are caucusing groups whose voting behavior in the 
GA reflects prior formal compromise. Additionally, the IBSA and BRICS as well as the 
G7 are informal institutions or “clubs” and maintain a similar membership size. 
 
Probabilistic methods of voting: Two approaches 
In the following section, we discuss two different, yet complementary, approaches used to 
test our argument of counterbalancing by the rising powers against established powers and 
whether they register dissatisfaction with the status quo through contestation of the 
established Western-centered order. First, we use the W-NOMINATE estimation 
technique developed by Poole et al. (2011) to analyze all roll-call votes taken in the GA 
across the two time periods specified. Using the assumptions of spatial voting models 
(Black 1958; Downs 1957), the method estimates voters’ ideal points, in this case, UN 
member states. States are assumed to maintain single-peaked preferences over an ideal 
choice in policy space, meaning possible options further from that choice are considered 
less desirable. In a one-dimensional model, each vote is represented by two points that 
correspond to the passage or failure of a resolution. States will either prefer the rejection 
or passage of a resolution based upon which is closest to their ideal point in Euclidean 
 
15
 The original 1975 forum included France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the US, 
becoming the G7 after Canada was included in the following year. 
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space. One advantage of W-NOMINATE is its ability to account for voter complexity, as 
preferences do not always accord with a single issue, or dimension. In multiple dimensions, 
the vote is a vector (with a given length and direction), and a state will have an ideal point 
associated with each dimension. Each roll-call vote is represented by a cutting line (or 
plane), which divides the yea from the nay votes. The proximity of a voter to a cutting line 
indicates the degree of confidence the model has in predicting whether a state will vote to 
accept or reject a resolution, where points that fall closer to the line reflect less certainty 
(Poole and Rosenthal 1991, 232). W-NOMINATE estimates the policy dimensions, the 
Euclidean distance from the location of the vote to the voter’s ideal point, and the weight 
of the dimensions. When applied to domestic legislatures, the dimensions tend to reflect 
left-right or government-opposition divisions; however, domestic ideological cleavages 
rarely translate to the international arena. Whereas domestic legislatures or the EU 
Parliament (Hix 2001) lend themselves to a certain degree of predictability, the absence of 
established political parties in international politics leads to greater uncertainty over the 
nature of these dimensions in the GA. Despite these challenges, there are a number of 
techniques that can aid in the identification of dimensions as the international level.  
 
W-NOMINATE is ideal for arenas in which groups are divided along more than one 
dimension, but it is not as adept in addressing the comparability of behavior over time. We 
therefore complement the analysis above with the method developed by Bailey et al. 
(2017). This technique is based on item response theory but shares many assumptions with 
W-NOMINATE.16 To allow for comparisons over time, the dynamic ordinal spatial model 
 
16
 Spatial methods such as IRT and W-NOMINATE both use cut points, which divide votes along a 




uses ‘bridge observations’ – resolutions in the GA that are identical over time – to identify 
whether changes in voting behavior are driven by a change in state preferences (Bailey et 
al. 2017, 435). Through the identification of these bridging votes, which isolate the cut 
points, shifting preferences may be ascertained from shifting parameters. However, this 
model is confined a single dimension and it treats abstentions as a midpoint between yes 
and no. We estimate the original IRT model as well as a modified version that categorizes 
nays and abstentions together to align it with the inputs of W-NOMINATE, allowing us to 
compare the findings from the W-NOMINATE analysis to the original and to our modified 
IRT models.  
 
The analysis of ideal points allows us to assess two things. First, how cohesively rising 
powers—both BRICS and IBSA—and established powers act in the GA across the two 
time periods. The measure of cohesion is the average Euclidean distance between the 
members of each group to their respective centroid.17 Second, the magnitude between the 
ideal points of the rising powers and the G7 serves an indicator of convergence/divergence 
among the groups of states. To measure the magnitude between the two groups, we 
calculate the Euclidean distances between their centroids. The positions of these states in 
relation to the cutting lines are an indication of the degree of disagreement between the 
groups of states. Cohesion and distance scores are presented in Table 1 below. 
 
Results 
Dimensionality of conflict 
 
Additionally, both methods are weighted. This prevents votes that diverge from the primary dimension of 
preferences from exacting undue influence on the estimates (Bailey et al. 2017, 433). 
17
 Because the IRT models are one-dimensional the centroid is the arithmetic mean of the ideal points. 
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The cohesion and distance of the BRICS and G7 groups are directly affected by the 
existence of multiple dimensions of voting. Thus, we briefly identify and discuss the salient 
dimensions before turning to the main results of the models. Further discussion of 
dimensionality may be found in the online appendix.   
 
Figures 1(a) and 1(b) present the ideal point estimates for the first and second periods of 
study, respectively. Cutting lines represent four broad issue areas of GA voting: economic 
development, human rights, nuclear proliferation and Israel/Palestine. The angles and 
positions of the cutting lines offer indications for the nature of the dimensions. Specifically, 
cutting lines with angles between 70 and 110 degrees fall within the first dimension, while 
angles of 0-30 degrees or 150-180 degrees fall within the second dimension. Lines that fall 
in the intermediate ranges occur in both dimensions (Voeten 2000).  
 
The median cutting lines of each issue area indicate a “West v. Rest” division, echoing 
Voeten’s (2000) findings. Issues of economic development, human rights and nuclear 
proliferation—with respective angles of 96, 101 and 82 degrees in the final period—present 
a clear divide between Western countries and most of the rest of the world. The angle for 
the Palestinian question, particularly from 2002-2011, falls well outside the exclusive first 
dimension (135 degrees) and even divides the U.S. and Canada from the rest of the G7. 
Figure 1, including the proximity of U.S. and Israeli ideal points in both periods (virtually 
stacked on top of each other), suggest a second dimension that is based on a pro/anti-Israel 
policy position. Having addressed the probable nature of two dimensions along which GA 
voting is structured, we now turn to the results of the two probabilistic methods of voting 
to determine whether the rising powers act as a bloc in the GA and the extent to which they 





Figure 1: (a) Spatial map 1992-2001 period with ideal points and group centroids. (b) 
Spatial map 2002-2011 period with ideal points and group centroids. 




Table 1 reports the findings of the three models— (1) W-NOMINATE, (2) IRT where 
abstentions are a mid-point between yea and nay and (3) IRT where abstentions are treated 
as nays. These findings lend strong support to our argument that the rising powers have 
begun to form a bloc of dissatisfied powers in the GA. As visual inspection of Figure 1 and 
the dispersion scores reported in Table 1 suggest, the rising powers have coalesced over 
the two periods. Models 1 and 2 indicate that the IBSA and BRICS countries maintained 
larger dispersion scores than the G7 group in the first post-Cold War decade (with the 
exception of IRT model (3)). The BRICS were highly dispersed with China and India far 
removed from the group centroid and Russia positioned closer to the G7 camp than to the 
other emerging powers. Three cutting lines in Figure 1(a) – nuclear proliferation, the 
Palestinian question and human rights divide China, India, Brazil and South Africa from 
Russia (and the G7 members), indicating substantial disagreement among the rising powers 
over these issues. Russia’s closer position to the Western camp in the GA captures the 
democratization period of Russian politics, when the country adopted a more open stance 
towards the West, joining the G8 as well as the Council of Europe. While the cutting lines 
and distance from the G7 reveal a general dissatisfaction with the status quo powers on the 
part of the rising powers, there is little to suggest that they were acting in concert to oppose 
the G7 position.  
 
Unlike the rising powers, the G7 group displays lower dispersion scores during the period 
1992-2001 in models 1 and 2, indicating that the status quo powers formed a cohesive 
group in the GA. As Figure 1 demonstrates, the G7 members also found themselves on the 
same side of all four cutting lines, indicating a high level of agreement across these issue 
areas. As the positions of cutting lines illustrate, the G7 countries were frequently in the 
minority. This is consistent with the view that the GA is a forum in which the Western 




In the second, post-Cold War, decade (2002-2011), the picture changes quite dramatically, 
as we observe significant convergence in the voting behavior among the rising powers. 
This convergence coincides with their institutionalization as BRICS and IBSA in the past 
decade. In fact, as their lower dispersion score reveals, the BRICS now vote nearly as 
(model 1) or more (models 2 and 3) cohesively than the G7 bloc (Table 1). This finding is 
consistent with the argument of a jointly dissatisfied bloc of rising powers. 
 
Even more striking is the percentage change in the dispersion score amongst the BRICS, 
IBSA, and G7 groups. Dispersion amongst the BRICS countries has contracted 
considerably, from 49% in model 1 to 77% in model 3. Compare this with the G7, which 
has also experienced a relative decline in dispersion over the two decades, but the change 
is much less dramatic, ranging from 4% to 11%. The changes in IBSA across the two 
periods have tracked more closely with the BRICS. Thus, the degree of change amongst 
the BRICS and IBSA groups is far more substantial than that of the G7. 
 
At the same time, there is some variation within the camps of emerging powers. While 
Russia has moved away from the West and closer to the rest of the rising powers, it remains 
on the opposite side of the nuclear proliferation and human rights median cutting lines 
compared to the remaining rising powers (Figure 1(b)). This offers some support for 
arguments that Russia, while it clearly has moved closer to the rising power bloc, is a 
special case within this group (Hart and Jones 2010, 67; MacFarlane 2006). Finally, in the 
second period, IBSA dispersion scores are lower than those of the G7 and BRICS in models 
1 and 2. This would be consistent with arguments that the IBSA states – democratic 
countries from the global South – maintain common positions in global affairs and may 
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even share a sense of collective identity (Antkiewicz and Cooper 2011, 303).18 It is also 
consistent with the findings of Mielniczuk’s (2013) study according to which the rising 
powers have formed a discursive bloc in the GA to employ common public rhetoric that 
centers on notions of multipolarity, non-intervention, poverty alleviation and the 
restructuring of international institutions (1087).  
 
Turning to the G7, we find that these states continue to display a high level of voting 
cohesion, indicated by their low dispersion scores in the second period. As the cutting lines 
in Figure 1 (b) demonstrate, the US and Canada (and a few small island states) vote with 
Israel, while the other members of the G7 vote with the large majority of the UN member 
states. Moreover, we observe a widening gap between the US and the other G7 members, 
a result that we can observe both visually and in terms of the ideal points across all models. 
This offers support for the argument that the US, while clearly in the Western ‘camp’ in 
the GA, has become a rather ‘lonely’ superpower (Voeten 2004). 
 
Overall, both methods – W-NOMINATE and IRT – indicate voting convergence among 
the rising powers, lending strong support to our argument that, despite their differences, 
the rising powers have begun to form a bloc in the second period under investigation that 
was characterized by the accelerated economic growth within the rising power camp, a 
change in the international dynamics (decline of Western self-restraint and effectiveness), 
and the institutionalization of the rising powers as IBSA and BRICS. 
 
18 Looking distribution of identities among great powers Allan et al. (2018) do not find evidence for a 
distinct identity shared by the rising powers. 
29 
 
Table 1: Measures of dispersion and distance in GA voting models 
 
 
 Model 1 
W-NOMINATE* 
Model 2 
IRT- Abstentions as nays† 
Model 3 
IRT-Abstentions as midpoint†† 








1992-2001 2002-2011 % 
change 
Dispersion          
BRICS 
0.509 0.257 -49.51% 0.543 0.208 -61.69% 0.114 0.026 -77.19% 
IBSA 
0.362 0.131 -63.81% 0.395 0.095 -75.95% 0.088 0.056 -36.36% 
G7 
0.273  0.248  -9.16% 0.464 0.444 -4.34% 0.376 0.334 -11.17% 
Distance          
BRICS-G7 
1.067 1.090 +2.16% 1.898 1.772 -6.64% 0.921 0.911 -1.09% 
IBSA-G7 
1.149 1.079 -6.09% 2.014 1.783 -11.47% 0.986 0.940 -4.67% 
μ distance 
0.760 0.746 -1.8% 0.883 0.893 +1.02% 0.366 0.349 -4.64% 
 
Notes: Dispersion is the average of the absolute values of the distance from the centroid. “μ distance” is the average distance between 
any two ideal points in the GA. 
*Ideal point values between [-1, 1].  
†Ideal point values between [-1.47, 1.67].  
††Ideal point values between [-1.90, 3.01]. 
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Distances between the two blocs  
Having established the degree of in-group cohesion, we turn to how the rising powers 
position themselves vis-à-vis the established powers. Do they vote against the dominant 
Western powers, as our argument suggests, or do we rather observe convergence in the 
voting behavior of rising and established powers, suggesting that processes of socialization 
and integration are at work? To answer this question, we examine the Euclidean distances 
between centroids of the BRICS and IBSA states and the G7.  
 
The position of the groups in relation to the cutting lines in Figure 1(b) and the distance 
scores reported in Table 1 support the proposition that the rising powers – with the partial 
exception of Russia – are dissatisfied, disagreeing with the established powers over key 
issues international politics. Not only do both BRICS and IBSA members frequently vote 
against the G7 countries, the distances between the two camps are also large – well above 
the average distance between any two members of the GA for that period (as shown in the 
final row of Table 1, “ distance”). Across all models, the distance between the BRICS 
and the G7 is around 50% greater than the average distance and, in some cases, it is nearly 
2.5 times larger (models 2 and 3).19 The difference between the groups is even more 
striking in both of the IRT models (2 and 3), where the distances between the G7 and 
BRICS fall within the 95th percentile. The extent of disagreement between rising and 
established powers becomes even clearer when we compare the scores in Table 1 to other 
meaningful distances between two ideal points. Using distance scores from model 1, we 
know, for instance, that the US and Israel are close allies and have very similar foreign 
 
19
 W-NOMINATE plots the ideal points on a scale ranging from -1 to 1 on both dimensions. Hence, 
the maximum theoretical Euclidean distance that one member of the GA can be from another is 2; the 
minimum distance is 0. 
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policy preferences, which is reflected in an average distance between their ideal points of 
0.02. Likewise, the distance between the two EU members, Germany and France, is 0.19. 
Whereas, the distance between the US and North Korea is 1.99, meaning that the two 
countries are almost always opposed in the GA.  
 
While our results show that the distance between both groups is large, and that new and 
old powers disagree substantially over important issues in international politics, we also 
find that the distances between the BRICS and IBSA states and the G7 have remained fairly 
stable over time. There has not been a marked shift in the sense of a convergence of their 
voting behavior, nor do our results suggest that the two groups have drifted further apart. 
This is in spite of increasing participation of the rising powers in international 
organizations. From 1992-2011 shared memberships in intergovernmental organizations 
for the BRICS countries increased by 11.4%.20 However, increased shared memberships 
with established powers, has not led to socialization nor interest convergence on the part 
of the rising powers. What our data does reveal is a relatively persistent chasm between 
these two groups of states despite more opportunities for socialization. While this division 
is not new, what has changed is that the rising powers have become much more powerful, 
to a point where they are considered as ‘systemically important’ in that major international 
problems such as financial crises can no longer be addressed without them (Payne 2014, 
1).   
 
The large Euclidean distance between the two camps, their location on different sides of 
the various cutting lines, and the significant convergence in the voting of the rising powers 
 
20 Using the Correlates of War Intergovernmental Organizations Data (Pevehouse, et al. 2004), we 
assessed BRICS shared memberships in over 300 IGOs. 
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during the past decade, together offer strong support to our argument that the rising powers 
form partnerships in which the dissatisfied states align in opposition to the status-quo 
coalition. 
 
These findings — rising power cohesion has increased significantly and the distance 
between them and the G7 is large and relatively stable over time — contradict the widely-
held view that the rising powers form a heterogeneous group of competing countries, and 
they challenge theories of accommodation and socialization, which would predict interest 
convergence over time (Bearce and Bondanella 2007). What our results clearly show is 
that there is no evidence for an alignment of interests between new and old powers. 
Contrary to Ikenberry’s claim, we observe the persistence of a “contested and fragmented 
system of blocs” rather than an “ultimate ascendance” of a liberal global order, at least 
when we consider the voting behavior of rising and established powers in the UN General 
Assembly (Ikenberry 2011, 56-57).  
 
Conclusion 
Few observers dispute that the current power shift is real. What is much more contentious 
is whether the rising powers are dissatisfied with the international status quo and whether 
they act as a bloc. To help answer this key question in world politics, this paper proposes 
an argument for assessing the degree of dissatisfaction among rising powers and whether 
that dissatisfaction is reflected through the formation of a counterhegemonic bloc within 
the context of the GA. 
We contribute to this research program by advancing an argument of rising power 
dissatisfaction highlighting three important motivations – the quest for influence, status, 
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and their objection to prevailing norms that have come to dominate multilateral institutions 
like the United Nations. These motivations combine with endogenous factors, changing 
international dynamics, and their institutionalization on the basis of their shared 
dissatisfaction.    
Methodologically, we contribute to the systematic analysis of rising power behavior by 
testing these propositions through spatial modeling techniques, analyzing rising power 
behavior in the GA across a range of issue areas and over time. We find notable 
convergence among rising powers, demonstrated by substantial tightening of the policy 
space among them. Thus, the rising powers are now considered to be system relevant and 
their voting behavior suggests a commonality of dissatisfaction with the international status 
quo. Moreover, the results reveal persistent disagreement between old and new powers and 
are at odds with arguments that predict their harmonious integration into the ‘liberal’ world 
order. Rather, their behavior within international fora such as the UNSC where they worked 
together to block a meaningful response to the war in Syria, or their individual foreign 
policies outside IOs, such as Russia’s annexation of Crimea or China’s “one-belt-one-road” 
project suggest that the rising powers have become more assertive. 
 
We have focused on one particular forum, the GA, in which rising powers share 
membership with established powers; however, shared IOs are clearly not the only arenas 
in which rising powers can challenge the international status quo. Our argument of 
contestation as a group of dissatisfied states also applies to new organizations that exclude 
established powers, such as the New Development Bank and the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation, as well as continued coordination through informal institutions like the G20. 
Future research should analyze rising power behavior in these institutions in comparable 
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ways to understand the scope and depth of the dynamics of bloc formation and contestation 
as well as their implications for institutional reform (Zangl et al. 2016). 
 
Another avenue for future research is to investigate to what extent the rising powers engage 
in active coordination to counter the established powers. In the context of GA voting, our 
data cannot directly address this question, however, as states typically negotiate behind 
closed doors. Observers have noted that the BRICS “are holding regular meetings of their 
permanent representatives of the UN in New York and Geneva to coordinate policies” 
(Armijio and Roberts 2014, 505), but they also point out that a difficulty for research on 
BRICS foreign policy interaction is that the BRICS make available little or no information 
about the actual outcomes of these various interactions (Hoojimaaijers and Keukeleire 
2016, 393).   
 
However, scholars and practitioners suggest that the BRICS and IBSA states coordinate in 
other institutions and fora. In the context of the WTO, Hopewell finds that “Brazil, India 
and China exhibited a remarkable degree of collaboration. Aligning themselves with one 
another to counter the traditional powers, the emerging powers were highly successful in 
accommodating their differences, coordinating their positions wherever possible, and 
managing inevitable tensions within their relationship” (2017, 1369). With regard to the 
BRICS, Desai concludes that “[n]ot since the days of the Non-Aligned Movement and its 
demand for a New International Economic Order in the 1970s has the world seen such a 
co-ordinated challenge to western supremacy in the world economy from developing 
countries,”  while a senior Obama administration official stated that it was “remarkable 
how closely coordinated [Brazil, South Africa, India, China] have become in international 
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fora, taking turns to impede US/EU initiatives” (cited in Wade 2011, 347). Whether rising 
powers coordinate their foreign policies at the UN deserves more scholarly attention.  
 
For all the discussion of new versus enduring global orders, there is little consensus among 
scholars and practitioners of international relations on what to call the current global 
moment and its corresponding power distribution. While the present era of international 
politics still searches for a name, there is little doubt that some countries that have remained 
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